Since the late 1950s and early 1960s, the English-speaking Caribbean region has tried unsuccessfully to coalesce into a strong union. Attempts at creating a West Indies Federation failed as nationalistic ambitions—first in Jamaica, followed in quick succession by Trinidad and Tobago—foiled the emergence of a nation of ten states.
Despite Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, Barbados, and Guyana gaining political independence relatively quickly from Britain by 1966, the four nations negotiated another regional agreement in Chaguaramas, Trinidad, in 1973. The Treaty of Chaguaramas created the Caribbean Community and Common Market (CARICOM) to promote economic integration and cooperation among the member states. CARICOM replaced another attempt at regional grouping, the Caribbean Free Trade Association (CARIFTA), formed in 1968.
Membership in CARICOM has expanded significantly since 1973 to currently consist of 15 member states, including Haiti, The Bahamas, Belize, Suriname, and Montserrat, which were not members of the former West Indies Federation.
Although CARICOM has prevailed and grown over the past 52 years, it has struggled and is by no means a perfect regional union. While it remains relevant in principle, its effectiveness in practice is widely debated. CARICOM has achieved some successes but faces persistent challenges that limit its impact in today’s fast-changing global environment.
Evidence of CARICOM’s seeming ineffectiveness includes its tendency toward slow implementation of agreements—such as the free movement of people and goods between states—and national chauvinism, with leaders of respective nations often prioritizing their national interests over regional unity. The priorities of richer member states like Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, and Barbados differ greatly from those of the poorer nations, often making the creation of unified policies difficult. Also contributing to the union’s ineffectiveness is the fact that CARICOM’s decisions are not binding unless members voluntarily comply. Another significant weakness is that most Caribbean citizens are not even familiar with the role of CARICOM; those who are tend to feel disconnected and see little direct benefit. Finally, CARICOM has proven to be much too bureaucratic, with a plethora of meetings and declarations, but weak execution of the decisions made in these many meetings.
Some critics of CARICOM attribute its relative ineffectiveness to the union’s lack of governance over an issue that significantly affects the entire region. But in recent months, there have been signs of the emergence of such a common issue: the need to create a regional security system to protect the region from both internal and external threats.
Recently, there have been threats to Guyana based on its border dispute with Venezuela; threats to the stability of Haiti due to ongoing gang violence; and threats to the region from an aggressive U.S. policy aimed at deterring drug traffickers.
Realistically, the Caribbean region cannot counter external military threats through conventional military methods. However, “counter” does not necessarily mean fighting—it can mean deterring, neutralizing, or mitigating threats through strategic, diplomatic, and regional actions.
Last week, CARICOM issued a statement reaffirming the region as a “Zone of Peace.” This underscores the important objective of using dialogue and engagement toward the peaceful resolution of disputes and conflicts. The Community also reiterated its willingness to assist in efforts to defuse tensions and its commitment to fighting narcotrafficking and the illegal trade in small arms and light weapons, noting that such challenges should be addressed through international cooperation and in accordance with international law.
But to many, this latest declaration rings hollow and lacks an explanation of how this so-called “Zone of Peace” is to be effective.
What the leaders of CARICOM need to do, as a matter of urgency, is to revitalize the Regional Security System (RSS) and create a unified Caribbean Defense and Security Council (CDSC) that focuses on intelligence sharing, cyber defense, and maritime surveillance—creating limited but effective coordinated forces, including regional coast guards and rapid-response units. There is also a need for a Caribbean Maritime Defense Agreement that enhances collective deterrence against external threats and coercion.
CARICOM should also work through the United Nations, the Organization of American States (OAS), and international courts to constrain or condemn unilateral external military actions, while building alliances with neutral powers like the European Union, the African Union, and Latin American states to provide diplomatic cover and economic alternatives.
The time is now for CARICOM to focus on building non-military defenses by investing in cybersecurity, information resilience, and civil defense planning.
To further underscore its position as a Zone of Peace, CARICOM should immediately use public diplomacy and media influence to defuse growing regional tensions with the U.S. and focus on highlighting U.S.–Caribbean interdependence.
The Caribbean’s best defense against external and internal threats is not, and essentially cannot be, military confrontation, but rather unity, diplomacy, diversification, and resilience. A coherent, stable, and cooperative region—effectively led—will serve as a deterrent, making it strategically unwise for foreign or internal forces to threaten or undermine it.
Hopefully, CARICOM will become more unified and effective as a regional grouping as it faces external threats and as each member state realizes that their national development can be stronger by being an integral and active part of this group.
